Same allocation proposed by an individual or a group elicits distinct responses: Evidence from event-related potentials and neural oscillation.

People tend to perceive the same information differently depending on whether it is expressed in an individual or a group frame. It has also been found that the individual (vs. group) frame of expression tends to lead to more charitable giving and greater tolerance of wealth inequality. However, little is known about whether the same resource allocation in social interactions elicits distinct responses depending on proposer type. Using the second-party punishment task, this study examined whether the same allocation from different proposers (individual vs. group) leads to differences in recipient behavior and the neural mechanisms. Behavioral results showed that reaction times were longer in the unfair (vs. fair) condition, and this difference was more pronounced when the proposer was the individual (vs. group). Neural results showed that proposer type (individual vs. group) influenced early automatic processing (indicated by AN1, P2, and central alpha band), middle processing (indicated by MFN and right frontal theta band), and late elaborative processing (indicated by P3 and parietal alpha band) of fairness in resource allocation. These results revealed more attentional resources were captured by the group proposer in the early stage of fairness processing, and more cognitive resources were consumed by processing group-proposed unfair allocations in the late stage, possibly because group proposers are less identifiable than individual proposers. The findings provide behavioral and neural evidence for the effects of "individual/group" framing leading to cognitive differences. They also deliver insights into social governance issues, such as punishing individual and/or group violations.

Chimpanzees engage in competitive altruism in a triadic ultimatum game.

Partner choice promotes competition among individuals to be selected as a cooperative partner, a phenomenon referred to as competitive altruism. We explored whether chimpanzees engage in competitive altruism in a triadic Ultimatum Game where two proposers can send offers simultaneously or consecutively to a responder who can only accept one of the two competing offers. In a dyadic control condition only one proposer at a time could send an offer to the responder. Chimpanzees increased their offers across trials in the competitive triadic, but not in the dyadic control condition. Chimpanzees also increased their offers after being rejected in previous triadic trials. Furthermore, we found that chimpanzees, under specific conditions, outcompete first proposers in triadic consecutive trials before the responder could choose which offer to accept by offering more than what is expected if they acted randomly or simply offered the smallest possible amount. These results suggest that competitive altruism in chimpanzees did not emerge just as a by-product of them trying to increase over previous losses. Chimpanzees might consider how others' interactions affect their outcomes and engage in strategies to maximize their chances of being selected as cooperative partners.

An experimental game to assess hunter's participation in zoonotic diseases surveillance.

BACKGROUND: Strengthening the surveillance of zoonotic diseases emergence in the wild meat value chains is a critical component of the prevention of future health crises. Community hunters could act as first-line observers in zoonotic pathogens surveillance systems in wildlife, by reporting early signs of the possible presence of a disease in the game animals they observe and manipulate on a regular basis. METHODS: An experimental game was developed and implemented in a forested area of Gabon, in central Africa. Our objective was to improve our understanding of community hunters' decision-making when finding signs of zoonotic diseases in game animals: would they report or dissimulate these findings to a health agency? 88 hunters, divided into 9 groups of 5 to 13 participants, participated in the game, which was run over 21 rounds. In each round the players participated in a simulated hunting trip during which they had a chance of capturing a wild animal displaying clinical signs of a zoonotic disease. When signs were visible, players had to decide whether to sell/consume the animal or to report it. The last option implied a lowered revenue from the hunt but an increased probability of early detection of zoonotic diseases with benefits for the entire group of hunters. RESULTS: The results showed that false alerts-i.e. a suspect case not caused by a zoonotic disease-led to a decrease in the number of reports in the next round (Odds Ratio [OR]: 0.46, 95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.36-0.8, p < 0.01). Hunters who had an agricultural activity in addition to hunting reported suspect cases more often than others (OR: 2.05, 95% CI: 1.09-3.88, p < 0.03). The number of suspect case reports increased with the rank of the game round (Incremental OR: 1.11, CI: 1.06-1.17, p < 0.01) suggesting an increase in participants' inclination to report throughout the game. CONCLUSION: Using experimental games presents an added value for improving the understanding of people's decisions to participate in health surveillance systems.

Social Expectations are Primarily Rooted in Reciprocity: An Investigation of Fairness, Cooperation, and Trustworthiness.

Social expectations guide people's evaluations of others' behaviors, but the origins of these expectations remain unclear. It is traditionally thought that people's expectations depend on their past observations of others' behavior, and people harshly judge atypical behavior. Here, we considered that social expectations are also influenced by a drive for reciprocity, and people evaluate others' actions by reflecting on their own decisions. To compare these views, we performed four studies. Study 1 used an Ultimatum Game task where participants alternated Responder and Proposer roles. Modeling participants' expectations suggested they evaluated the fairness of received offers via comparisons to their own offers. Study 2 replicated these findings and showed that observing selfish behavior (lowball offers) only promoted acceptance of selfishness if observers started acting selfishly themselves. Study 3 generalized the findings, demonstrating that they also arise in the Public Goods Game, emerge cross-culturally, and apply to antisocial punishment whereby selfish players punish generosity. Finally, Study 4 introduced the Trust Game and showed that participants trusted players who reciprocated their behavior, even if it was selfish, as much as they trusted generous players. Overall, this research shows that social expectations and evaluations are rooted in drives for reciprocity. This carries theoretical implications, speaking to a parallel in the mechanisms driving both decision-making and social evaluations, along with practical importance for understanding and promoting cooperation.

Electrophysiological evidence for sensitization effects elicited by concurrent social threats.

Experiencing a social threat, such as social exclusion, is a painful event. In contrast to previous studies providing insight into the processing of a single short-termed threat, we exposed healthy individuals to the simultaneous onset of different social threats. This approach allowed us to track whether these threats are processed independently-or whether they interact in a common system. Using a virtual ball-throwing game (Cyberball), electrophysiological (event-related brain potentials, ERPs) and behavioral (self-reports) responses were collected. We assigned undergraduates to three experimental groups: single threat exclusion (n = 24), single threat loss of control (n = 26), and joint onset of both threats (dual-threat, n = 25). Self-reports indicated an increase in threats (i.e., in perceived exclusion and loss-of-control) in the latter group. The ERPs disentangled the neural responses to each threat: In the dual-threat group, the amplitudes of the P3 responses to exclusionary and intervention events were enhanced. This indicates that individuals are sensitized to each of the threats when the other threat is present simultaneously. Our findings support the theoretical notion of a common cognitive system responding to violations in subjective expectations.

Individuals reciprocate negative actions revealing negative upstream reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity is widely recognized as a mechanism for explaining cooperation and can be divided into two sub-concepts: downstream and upstream reciprocity. Downstream reciprocity is supported by reputation; if someone sees you helping someone else, the person who sees this will think higher of you, and you will be more likely to be helped. Upstream reciprocity is helping someone because you are being helped by somebody else, which often happens in everyday life and experimental games. This paper focuses on the behavior of "take" and examines negative upstream reciprocity using an upstream reciprocity framework. The term "take" is defined as "to steal rather than give resources to others." "If something is taken from you, do you take from others?" is an important extension for indirect reciprocity research; subsequently, this paper discusses experiments conducted on whether negative upstream reciprocity is chained and what causes it. The results demonstrated differences between positive and negative upstream reciprocity. In analyzing the data of nearly 600 participants to determine the extent to which negative upstream reciprocity is observed and the causes of negative upstream reciprocity, the study found that If individual A takes resources from individual B, then B is more likely to take resources from a third-party, individual C. Notably, some causes of positive upstream reciprocity were found to have no effect or the opposite effect on negative upstream reciprocity. The results also demonstrate that the first person to take can cause a chain reaction. This paper demonstrates the importance of the first person not taking from someone else and suggests the need to consider various behavioral options for future research on cooperation.

Expertise increases planning depth in human gameplay.

A hallmark of human intelligence is the ability to plan multiple steps into the future1,2. Despite decades of research3-5, it is still debated whether skilled decision-makers plan more steps ahead than novices6-8. Traditionally, the study of expertise in planning has used board games such as chess, but the complexity of these games poses a barrier to quantitative estimates of planning depth. Conversely, common planning tasks in cognitive science often have a lower complexity9,10 and impose a ceiling for the depth to which any player can plan. Here we investigate expertise in a complex board game that offers ample opportunity for skilled players to plan deeply. We use model fitting methods to show that human behaviour can be captured using a computational cognitive model based on heuristic search. To validate this model, we predict human choices, response times and eye movements. We also perform a Turing test and a reconstruction experiment. Using the model, we find robust evidence for increased planning depth with expertise in both laboratory and large-scale mobile data. Experts memorize and reconstruct board features more accurately. Using complex tasks combined with precise behavioural modelling might expand our understanding of human planning and help to bridge the gap with progress in artificial intelligence.

Recensión: eficacia de un programa de entrenamiento de ajedrez para mejorar la cognición, el estado de ánimo y la calidad de vida en adultos mayores: un estudio piloto / Critical review: effectiveness of a chess-training program for improving cognition, mood, and quality of life in older adults: a pilot study

El estudio citado nos proporciona un acercamiento al uso del ajedrez para reducir el riesgo de desarrollar deterioro cognitivo y/o demencia. Se lleva a cabo un estudio piloto controlado, no aleatorizado, con evaluaciones antes y después de un programa de entrenamiento de ajedrez con 22 adultos mayores institucionalizados y semiinstitucionalizados. Se valoran los efectos de esta intervención sobre el estado cognitivo, estado de ánimo y calidad de vida. Se obtienen mejoras significativas en el estado cognitivo y en la percepción de la calidad de vida de los/as participantes.(AU)

This study presents an approach to the use of chess to reduce the risk of developing cognitive impairment and/or dementia. A pilot controlled, non-randomised study was conducted with evaluations before and after a chess training programme with 22 older adults who were institutionalised and semi-institutionalised. The study aimed to assess the effects of this intervention on participants' cognitive status, mood, and quality of life. Significant improvements are obtained in the cognitive state and in the perception of the quality of life of the participants.(AU)

Event-related potentials during the ultimatum game in people with symptoms of depression and/or social anxiety.

Depression and social anxiety are common disorders that have a profound impact on social functioning. The need for studying the neural substrates of social interactions in mental disorders using interactive tasks has been emphasized. The field of neuroeconomics, which combines neuroscience techniques and behavioral economics multiplayer tasks such as the Ultimatum Game (UG), can contribute in this direction. We assessed emotions, behavior, and Event-Related Potentials in participants with depression and/or social anxiety symptoms (MD/SA, n = 63, 57 females) and healthy controls (n = 72, 67 females), while they played the UG. In this task, participants received fair, mid-value, and unfair offers from other players. Mixed linear models were implemented to assess trial level changes in neural activity. The MD/SA group reported higher levels of sadness in response to mid-value and unfair offers compared to controls. In controls, the Medial Frontal Negativity associated with fair offers increased over time, while this dynamic was not observed in the MD/SA group. The MD/SA group showed a decreased P3/LPP in all offers, compared to controls. These results indicate an enhanced negative emotional response to unfairness in the MD/SA group. Neural results reveal a blunted response over time to positive social stimuli in the MD/SA group. Moreover, between-group differences in P3/LPP may relate to a reduced saliency of offers and/or to a reduced availability of resources for processing incoming stimuli in the MD/SA group. Findings may shed light into the neural substrates of social difficulties in these disorders.

Moral transgression modulates fairness considerations in the ultimatum game: Evidence from ERP and EEG data.

People tend to dislike and punish unfair behaviors in social interactions, and this disposition may be moderated by the characteristics of their interaction partner. We used a modified ultimatum game (UG) to investigate players' responses to fair and unfair offers from proposers described as having performed either a moral transgression or a neutral behavior, and recorded an electroencephalogram. The participants' behavior in the UG suggests that people quickly demand more fairness from proposers who have committed moral transgressions rather than neutral behavior. Event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed a significant effect of offer type and of proposer type on P300 activity. The prestimulus α-oscillation power in the neutral behavior condition was significantly lower than that in the moral transgression condition. The post-stimulus ß-event-related synchronization (ß-ERS) was larger for the moral transgression condition than the neutral behavior condition in response to the least fair offers, and larger for neutral behavior than the moral transgression condition in response to the fairest offers. In summary, ß-ERS was influenced by both proposer type and offer type, which revealed different neural responses to the offer from either a morally transgressive or a neutral behavior proposer.

Intention affects fairness processing: Evidence from behavior and representational similarity analysis of event-related potential signals.

In an ultimatum game, the responder must decide between pursuing self-interest and insisting on fairness, and these choices are affected by the intentions of the proposer. However, the time course of this social decision-making process is unclear. Representational similarity analysis (RSA) is a useful technique for linking brain activity with rich behavioral data sets. In this study, electroencephalography (EEG) was used to measure the time course of neural responses to proposed allocation schemes with different intentions. Twenty-eight participants played an ultimatum game as responders. They had to choose between accepting and rejecting the fair or unfair money allocation schemes of proposers. The schemes were offered based on the proposer's selfish intention (monetary gain), altruistic intention (donation to charity), or ambiguous intention (unknown to the responder). We used a spatiotemporal RSA and inter-subject RSA (IS-RSA) to explore the connections between event-related potentials (ERPs) after offer presentation and intention presentation with four types of behavioral data (acceptance, response time, fairness ratings, and pleasantness ratings). The spatiotemporal RSA results revealed that only response time variation was linked with the difference in ERPs at 432-592 ms after offer presentation on the posterior parietal and prefrontal regions. Meanwhile, the IS-RSA results found a significant association between inter-individual differences in response time and differences in ERP activity at 596-812 ms after the presentation of ambiguous intention, particularly in the prefrontal region. This study expands the intention-based reciprocal model to the third-party context and demonstrates that brain activity can represent response time differences in social decision-making.

Role of right temporoparietal junction for counterfactual evaluation of partner's decision in ultimatum game.

Humans assess the distributions of resources based on their aversion to unfairness. If a partner distributes in an unfair manner even though the partner had a less unfair distribution option, a recipient will believe that the partner should have chosen the counterfactual option. In this study, we investigated the neural basis for fairness evaluation of actual and counterfactual options in the ultimatum game. In this task, a partner chose one distribution option out of two options, and a participant accepted or rejected the option. The behavioral results showed that the acceptance rate was influenced by counterfactual evaluation (CE), among others, as defined by the difference of monetary amount between the actual and counterfactual options. The functional magnetic resonance imaging results showed that CE was associated with the right ventral angular gyrus (vAG) that provided one of convergent inputs to the supramarginal gyrus related to decision utility, which reflects gross preferences for the distribution options. Furthermore, inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation administered to the right vAG reduced the behavioral component associated with CE. These results suggest that our acceptance/rejection of distribution options relies on multiple processes (monetary amount, disadvantageous inequity, and CE) and that the right vAG causally contributes to CE.

Altered social decision making in patients with chronic pain.

BACKGROUND: Chronic pain affects up to 20% of the population, impairs quality of life and reduces social participation. Previous research reported that pain-related perceived injustice covaries with these negative consequences. The current study probed whether chronic pain patients responded more strongly to disadvantageous social inequity than healthy individuals. METHODS: We administered the Ultimatum Game, a neuroeconomic social exchange game, where a sum of money is split between two players to a large sample of patients with chronic pain disorder with somatic and psychological factors (n = 102) and healthy controls (n = 101). Anonymised, and in truth experimentally controlled, co-players proposed a split, and our participants either accepted or rejected these offers. RESULTS: Chronic pain patients were hypersensitive to disadvantageous inequity and punished their co-players for proposed unequal splits more often than healthy controls. Furthermore, this systematic shift in social decision making was independent of patients' performance on tests of executive functions and risk-sensitive (non-social) decision making . CONCLUSIONS: Our findings indicate that chronic pain is associated with anomalies in social decision making (compared to healthy controls) and hypersensitivity to social inequity that is likely to negatively impact social partaking and thereby the quality of life.

C-H-E-A-T: Wordle Cheating Is Related to Religiosity and Cultural Tightness.

Wordle is a daily, online brainteaser. The widespread popularity of the game in the early months of 2022 has also led to widespread cheating. Here, we use data from Google Trends and Twitter to explore correlates of cheating on Wordle. We find that cheating behavior is negatively related to religiosity and cultural tightness. Although this is a benign example of cheating behavior, we discuss how popular trends can be used as case studies of group-level behavior.

The role of emotion regulation and choice repetition bias in the ultimatum game.

Social decision-making is commonly explored in the context of adult responder behavior in the ultimatum game. Responder behavior in the game has been proposed to be the consequence of two competing systems that control behavior: an affective system, which promotes an emotional response to unfair offers, and a deliberative system, which instead encourages a rational response to maximize in-game gains. In a secondary analysis of ultimatum game data in children and adolescents (N = 429), the present study demonstrated that trial-level metrics of responder behavior were reflective of a dual systems framework. However, no consistent relationship was found between responder behavior and trait-level measures of emotion regulation. Choice history was found to influence all measures of responder behavior in the game. These results support a dual systems account of social decision-making in children and adolescents and highlight choice repetition bias as an additional factor influencing decision-making within the ultimatum game. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The effect of incorrect prior information on trust behavior in adolescents.

During adolescence, social cognition and the brain undergo major developments. Social interactions become more important, and adolescents must learn that not everyone can be trusted equally. Prior knowledge about the trustworthiness of an interaction partner may affect adolescents' expectations about the partner. However, the expectations based on prior knowledge can turn out to be incorrect, causing the need to respond adaptively during the interaction. In the current fMRI study, we investigated the effect of incorrect prior knowledge on adolescent trust behavior and on the neural processes of trust. Thirty-three adolescents (Mage = 17.2 years, SDage = 0.5 years) played two trust games with partners whose behavior was preprogrammed using an algorithm that modeled trustworthy behavior. Prior to the start of both games, participants received information suggesting that the partner in one game was untrustworthy (raising incorrect expectations) and the partner in the other game trustworthy (raising correct expectations). Results indicated that participants adapted their trust behavior following incorrect prior expectations. No evidence for a change in trust behavior was shown when prior expectations were correct. fMRI analyses revealed that when receiving the partner's response, activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and in the superior parietal gyrus were increased when participants had incorrect expectations about the partner compared to when participants had correct expectations. When making trust decisions, no significant differences in neural activity were found when comparing the two games. This study provides insight into how adolescent trust behavior and neural mechanisms are affected by expectations and provides an increased understanding of the factors that influence adolescent social interactions.

Testing the effects of the Strong Together self-advocacy serious game among women with advanced cancer: Protocol for the STRONG randomized clinical trial.

BACKGROUND: Women with advanced cancer experience significant barriers to achieving high-quality care and maximizing their physical and emotional health. Our novel serious game, Strong Together, aims to teach women with advanced cancer self-advocacy skills needed to improve their symptom burden, quality of life, and patient-centered care. METHODS: This is a single-center, multi-site randomized clinical trial of the Strong Together intervention among 336 women within three months of an advanced breast or gynecologic cancer diagnosis. Randomization occurs to the 3-month Strong Together serious game or enhanced care as usual group. The aims are to: (1) evaluate the effects of the intervention on patient self-advocacy (primary outcome); (2) evaluate the effects of the intervention on quality of life, symptom burden, and patient-centered care (secondary outcomes); and (3) evaluate the behavioral and game mechanisms that influence the efficacy of the intervention. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA: female, age ≥ 18 years; diagnosis of advanced breast or gynecologic cancer within the past 3 months; Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group score of 0-2; English literacy; and ≥ 6-month life expectancy. Patient-reported outcome measures are collected at baseline, 3-months, and 6-months. CONCLUSION: This protocol is the first large-scale intervention aimed at promoting self-advocacy in women with advanced cancer. Understanding the ability of serious games to impact patient outcomes provides critical information for researchers, clinicians, and stakeholders aiming to improve patient-centered care. TRIAL REGISTRATION: NCT04813276.

Corrupt third parties undermine trust and prosocial behaviour between people.

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that affects the quality of institutions, undermines economic growth and exacerbates inequalities around the globe. Here we tested whether perceiving representatives of institutions as corrupt undermines trust and subsequent prosocial behaviour among strangers. We developed an experimental game paradigm modelling representatives as third-party punishers to manipulate or assess corruption and examine its relationship with trust and prosociality (trust behaviour, cooperation and generosity). In a sequential dyadic die-rolling task, the participants observed the dishonest behaviour of a target who would subsequently serve as a third-party punisher in a trust game (Study 1a, N = 540), in a prisoner's dilemma (Study 1b, N = 503) and in dictator games (Studies 2-4, N = 765, pre-registered). Across these five studies, perceiving a third party as corrupt undermined interpersonal trust and, in turn, prosocial behaviour. These findings contribute to our understanding of the critical role that representatives of institutions play in shaping cooperative relationships in modern societies.